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Summary findings
In considering how the euro will affect Sub-Saharan  Capital flows to Sub-Saharan Africa can be affected
Africa, Cohen, Kristensen, and Verner examine the  through portfolio shifts or through changes in foreign
transmission channels through  which the euro could  direct investment.
affect economies in the region. They examine the risks  Changes in competitiveness in Europe are not
and opportunities the euro presents for Sub-Saharan  expected to influence foreign direct investment, so the
African countries.  euro is not expected to affect foreign direct investment
They especially examine the effects from the trade  significantly.
channel, through changes in European economic activity  Portfolio diversification could increase greatly. But
and the real exchange rate. Because of the relatively low  Sub-Saharan Africa is not expected to realize the
income elasticity for primary commodities - which is  increased potential from portfolio diversification because
what Sub-Saharan Africa mainly exports - an increase in  of its severely underdeveloped  domestic capital markets.
activity in Europe is considered to have a marginal  It is vitally important that Sub-Saharan African countries
impact on Africa.  strengthen their financial integration into global markets.
Exchange rate regimes and geographical trade patterns  How the euro will affect such parts of the financial
point to large differences in expostire to changes in the  system as banks and debt and reserve management varies
real exchange rate.  across countries. Generally the effect is expected to be
limited.
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January 1, 1999, marked the beginning of a new era of European economic and monetary
union  (EMU) as  11 of the  15 members of the European Union  (EU) adopted a  single
currency, the euro. The 11 countries have a combined population of 290.5 million people
and a total  1997 GDP of $5,890,291 million, making the euro a dominant  currency on
world markets and a potential challenge to the leadership of the U.S. dollar.' Most analysts
have focused on the impact of the euro on participating countries and their neighbors and
on Latin American countries 2.
This  paper  considers  the  impact  of  the  euro  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  looking  at  the
transmission channels through which the euro could affect the economies in the region and
at the risks and opportunities for Sub-Saharan African countries. It  examines economic
relations between Sub-Saharan Africa and the European Union and the financial relations
between  them,  looking  especially  at foreign  direct  investment, European  interest  rate
volatility,  and  portfolio  diversification  considerations.  It  also  considers  the  financial
implications for the banking system and foreign debt and reserve management.
Although African countries will be affected by all of these factors, none is likely to be of
macroeconomic importance to them.
2.  Economic relations between the European Union and Sub-Saharan Africa
Given the size and economic influence of the euro area, the EMU has the potential  to
significantly influence Sub-Saharan Africa's external trade and economic activity.
2.1. The Sub-Sahara African market
The market potential of Sub-Saharan Africa is considerable. The region has a combined
population  of 628 million people and a GDP of $913 billion. (table 1).3  Nigeria is by far,
the single largest country in terms of population-at  121 million inhabitants it is more than
l In current  international  dollars  (purchasing  power  parity);  excludes  Luxembourg.
2 See Desruelle  et al. (1998);  Feldman  and Temprano-Arroyo  (1998);  and  Verner  (1999).
2double  the  size  of  the  second  largest  country.  But  most  countries  in  the  region  are
relatively small, including the 14 CFA countries, whose population totals 97 million. 4 In
terms of total income, South Africa is the largest. Its share of the region's  GDP is equal to
that of all West and Central African countries combined. Income distribution in the region
diverges widely, ranging from $510 (PPP) per capita in Ethiopia to $7,380 in South Africa
and $9,310 in Mauritius (see table 1).
GDP growth was relatively high in many African economies in  1997. Twenty-two of the
39 countries for which GDP growth is reported in table  1 had an average annual growth
rate of  5 percent  or higher. Growth has  slowed considerably  since then, however,  and
prospects are for continued slow growth, given the severe global recession brought on by
weak demand, and large stockpiles. Further, prices for the region's  key commodities (see
next section) are the lowest in 30 years, and the outlook for long-term real prices is not
favorable. Most prices are expected to stagnate at their current lows until 2010, with severe
consequences for growth rates in Sub-Saharan Africa. 5
2.2. Activity effects through EU-African  trade
Some  43  percent  of  merchandise  imports  to  Sub-Saharan  Africa  originate  from  the
European Union,  an amount equivalent to 0.6 percent  of world  merchandise trade. EU
countries  account for  24 percent  of  all merchandise exports  from  Sub-Saharan Africa,
again equivalent to 0.6 percent of world merchandise trade (World Bank 1999b). For some
countries the share is much larger-  40 percent for the CFA countries, one-quarter of it
going to France (table 4).
EU merchandise imports from Sub-Saharan Africa grew nearly 6 percent during 1986-96,
while EU exports to the region grew nearly 5 percent. These numbers are well below the
10 percent growth in world merchandise trade over the same period (World Bank 1999b), a
reflection of the diminishing role of Sub-Saharan Africa in world trade over the last 40
3All  Sub-Saharan Africa countries with more than 1 mill. inhabitants are included in the analysis.
4 CFA franc zone members are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic
of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire,  Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.
Source: "Global Commodity Markets" World Bank quarterly publication, May 1999.
3Table 1. Basic indicators for Sub-Sahara African countries, latest available year
GDP 1997  GDP per capita
Population  (millions of  GDP growth  1997
1998  current PPP  1997  (current PPP
Country  (millions)  dollars)  (percent)  dollars)
West and CentralAfrica
Benin  6.0  7,377.1  5.6  1,270
Burkina Faso  11.3  10,543.1  6.6  1,010
Cameroon  14.5  26,406.4  5.1  1,890
Central African Republic  3.5  4,546.1  5.1  1,330
Chad  6.9  6,918.1  6.5  970
Congo, Rep. of  2.9  4,396.7  -1.9  1,620
Cote d'Ivoire  15.1  26,133.9  6.0  1,840
Equatorial Guinea  0.4  ..  76.1
Gabon  1.2  8,703.8  4.1  7,550
Guinea-Bissau  1.1  ..  5.0
Mali  10.6  7,637.2  6.7  740
Niger  10.0  8,291.6  3.5  850
Senegal  9.0  15,229.8  5.2  1,730
Togo  4.5  6,463.1  4.7  1,490
Gambia, The  1.2  1,730.9  5.4  1,470
Ghana  18.5  29,493.9  4.2  1,640
Guinea  7.1  13,015.6  4.8  1,880
Liberia  3.0
Mauritania  2.5  4,265.2  5.1  1,730
Nigeria  121.3  107,959.2  3.9  920
Sierra Leone  4.9  1,954.5  ..  410
East and Southern Africa
Angola  11.8  16,704.3  7.6  1,430
Botswana  1.5  11,796.2  6.9  7,690
Burundi  6.8  4,040.3  0.4  630
Congo, Dem. Rep.  48.1  40,881.8  -5.7  880
Eritrea  4.0  3,097.0  7.9  820
Ethiopia  62.1  30,193.8  5.6  510
Kenya  28.7  33,917.5  2.1  1,190
Lesotho  2.1  3,751.1  8.0  1,860
Madagascar  15.6  13,109.3  3.6  930
Malawi  10.5  7,277.7  5.1  710
Mauritius  1.2  10,688.9  5.0  9,310
Mozambique  19.0  12,324.1  12.4  740
Namibia  1.7  8,136.9  1.8  5,010
Rwanda  8.1  5,171.8  10.9  660
Somalia  10.5
South Africa  39.0  299,577.2  1.7  7,380
Sudan  28.5  43,388.8  4.6  1,560
Tanzania  32.2  18,091.0  4.1  580
Uganda  20.9  23,622.2  5.4  1,160
Zambia  9.7  9,086.6  3.5  960
Zimbabwe  11.7  26,930.6  3.7  2,350
CFA franc zone  96.9  132,646.8
West and Central Africa  255.2  291,066.0
East and Southern Africa  372.5  621,787.2
Sub-Saharan Africa  627.6  912,853.3
Note: Countries with fewer than I million inhabitants are not included (except for Equatorial Guinea, a member of the
CFA franc zone).
Source: World Bank 1999b,c.
4Table 2. Trade indicators  for Sub-Saharan  African  countries,  1997
Single most important export product to OECD
Openness
(exports as  Total trade  Percentage of
percentage  (millions of  Millions of U.S.  total exports to
Country  of GDP)  US dollars)  In value of trade  dollars  OECD
West and Central
Africa
Benin  16.6  77.778  Cotton  32.830  42.2
Burkina Faso  6.5  67.725  Cotton  38.936  57.5
Cameroon  12.2  1,874.895  Crude petroleum  680.546  36.3
Centr.African Rep.  9.5  144.910  Pearl, prec-, semi-p stone  106.373  73.4
Chad  3.4  94.946  Cotton  82.070  86.4
Congo, Rep. of  64.5  1,370.287  Crude petroleum  700.809  51.1
Cote d'lvoire  28.0  2,859.735  Cocoa  1,324.627  46.3
Equatorial Guinea  ..  204.917  Crude petroleum  117.934  57.6
Gabon  49.5  2,917.452  Crude petroleum  2,486.791  85.2
Guinea-Bissau  ..  14.492  Fish, fresh  11.178  77.1
Mali  18.2  117.389  Cotton  94.558  80.6
Niger  10.5  90.260  Medicinal etc. products  36.456  40.4
Senegal  8.4  371.742  Fish, fresh  176.746  47.5
Togo  22.6  126.592  Fertilizers, crude  55.820  44.1
Gambia, The  28.1  156.753  Pearl, prec-, semi-p stone  132.726  84.7
Ghana  17.0  1,215.887  Cocoa  422.629  34.8
Guinea  13.5  585.667  Non fer base mtl. ore, conc.  374.396  63.9
Liberia  ..  1,029.487  Ships and boats  660.109  64.1
Mauritania  26.4  505.769  Iron ore, conc.  272.401  53.9
Nigeria  21.0  12,516.209  Crude petroleum  11,337.293  90.6
Sierra Leone  23.1  192.108  Pearl, prec-, semi-p stone  129.101  67.2
East and Southern
Africa
Angola  38.5  3,614.481  Crude petroleum  3,153.998  87.3
Botswana
Burundi  5.2  80.947  Coffee  64.557  79.8
Congo, Dem. R  5.7  1,120.675  Pearl, prec-, semi-p stone  635.127  56.7
Eritrea  ..  9.158  Leather  2.571  28.1
Ethiopia  6.5  445.808  Coffee  316.822  71.1
Kenya  15.3  1,138.099  Coffee  329.787  29.0
Lesotho
Madagascar  10.5  595.869  Clothing not of fur  203.182  34.1
Malawi  20.0  371.890  Tobacco UNMFD  304.089  81.8
Mauritius  36.1  1,543.916  Clothing not of fur  903.458  58.5
Mozambique  11.9  182.571  Fish, fresh  89.032  48.8
Namibia
Rwanda  9.0  42.031  Coffee  33.102  78.8
Somalia  ..  29.195  Fruit, nuts  14.139  48.4
South Africa  20.8  15,319.178  Silver, platinum,  1,990.128  13.0
Sudan  4.6  241.270  Cotton  52.004  21.6
Tanzania  14.8  369.521  Coffee  112.765  30.5
Uganda  6.0  476.552  Coffee  375.522  78.8
Zambia  24.6  459.326  Copper  176.498  38.4
Zimbabwe  19.9  1,276.976  Tobacco UNMFD  387.027  30.3
Sub-Saharan  17.8  53,986.029  Crude petroleum  18,711.169  34.7
Africa
Note: OECD import data are used to get a picture of Sub-Saharan African exports because of problems with missing or
unreliable data when the reporting country is from Sub-Saharan Africa.
Source: OECD; UN Comtrade; and World Bank 1999b,c.
5years (Ng and Yeats  1997). The region's  declining role in world trade is also evident in
measures of trade openness (trade as a percentage of GDP) in Sub-Saharan Africa (chart
1). Trade openness fell from 30 percent of GDP in 1980 to 15 percent in 1985-86, where it
has remained. Current differences across countries in trade openness are large, ranging
from 3 percent of GDP in Chad to 65 percent in the Republic of Congo, even though both
countries are members of the CFA zone (table 2).
Sub-Saharan  African  exports  to  EMU  countries  are  almost  exclusively  primary
commodities, such as cotton, fruits, nuts, fish, coffee, pearls, silver, platinum, and crude
petroleum. Petroleum alone accounts for 35 percent of the value of Sub-Saharan African
export to OECD countries (table 2).
The importance of EU trade for Sub-Saharan Africa means that any impact of the euro on
GDP growth within Europe can have spillover effects on economic activity in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The effect of the euro on economic activity in Europe is expected to be positive, as
elimination of exchange rate risk and reductions in transaction costs result in increased
economic integration and competition within the European Union. The spillover effects on
economic activity in Sub-Saharan African countries will depend on the degree and nature
of market integration between the two regions.
Since primary commodities, which generally have a low income elasticity, account for the
greatest  share  of  exports  from  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  any  increase  in  exports  to  EMU
countries induced by economic growth in Europe will be limited. Desruelle et al. (1998)
estimate that the medium-term impact on CFA members of a  1 percent increase in euro-
area GDP would be a 0.6 percent increase in exports and a 0.2 percent increase in GDP.
The improvements in euro-area competitiveness are likely to  come, however, at least in
part at the expense of exporters from other regions, including  Sub-Saharan Africa.  The
elimination of exchange rate risk and transaction costs within Europe could result in trade
diversion and a reduction  of imports from outside the European Union.  Since few Sub-
Saharan African exports are in direct competition with goods produced in Europe,
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however, any adverse impact  on African exports is likely to be slight. A more significant
effect could arise from progress in reforming the EU Common  Agricultural  Policy. The
common  policy was discussed  recently,  but none of the issues  under discussion  is likely to
have any substantial  effects  for Sub-Saharan  Africa  countries.
2.3. Trade effects through  changes in the euro real exchange rate
The real exchange rate is another channel through which the euro could affect African
exports to Europe. Again, the composition of exports from Sub-Saharan African countries
is a central  variable,  but the lack of estimates  for the elasticity  of exports  to changes  in the
real exchange rate makes it hard to estimate the sensitivity of exports to such changes.
The effect  of changes in the real exchange rate depends on the exchange rate regime  in
each  country  (table  3)  and  on  geographical  trade  patterns.  Countries  that  peg  their
exchange rate to the euro would expect a loss of competitiveness relative to third parties if
7Table 3. Exchange rate regimes, December 31, 1997 (or later)
Exchange rate
Country  regime  Basket or target; remarks
West and Central Africa
CFA franc zone  Fixed peg  Euro (formerly pegged to French franc)
Gambia, The  Independent float
Ghana  Independent float
Guinea  Independent float
Liberia  Independent float  Pegged to the U.S. dollar
Mauritania  Managed float  Dual exchange rate structure
Nigeria  Managed float  Pegged to the U.S. dollar
Sierra Leone  Independent float
East and Southern Africa
Angola  Fixed peg  Pegged to the U.S. dollar since July 1, 1996
Botswana  Fixed peg  Basket of weighted currencies of regional trading partners and SDR
Burundi  Fixed peg  Basket of currencies of main trading partners
Congo, Dem. R.  Independent float
Eritrea  Independent float
Ethiopia  Managed float
Kenya  Managed float  U.S. dollar is the principal intervention currency
Lesotho  Fixed peg  South African rand
Madagascar  Independent float
Malawi  Managed float  Exchange rate is managed in a flexible manner with interventions
limited to smoothing out of rate fluctuations and considerations of
reserves levels
Mauritius  Managed float
Mozambique  Independent float
Namibia  Fixed peg  Pegged to the South African rand
Rwanda  Independent float
Somalia  Independent float  Dual exchange rate structure. Official rate applies to goods and
services and debt-service payments of the government. The U.S.
dollar is the principal intervention currency
South Africa  Independent float  Extemal value determined in the interbank market
Sudan  Managed float
Tanzania  Independent float
Uganda  Independent float  External value determined in the interbank market
Zambia  Independent float  Multible exchange rate structure. Market-determined official rate
Zimbabwe  Independent float  External value determined in the exchange market. The US dollar is
the intervention currency.
Source: IMF 1998.
the euro appreciates, an effect that will be stronger the smaller is the euro area's  share in
total trade (see table 4). Countries that peg to a basket of currencies of their main trading
partners will not  be  quite as  exposed and vulnerable to  fluctuations in  the euro.  CFA
members are among the most exposed and vulnerable to a loss of competitiveness. If the
euro appreciates relative to the U.S. dollar, countries with a relatively low share of exports
going to the European Union would be the most affected. Among these are Benin (16.9
%), Togo  (15.8  %),  Senegal (14.7 %), Guinea-Bissau (14.4  %), and  Gabon  (12.8 %).
Cameroon is the only CFA country with more than half its exports going to the European
Union (73 percent).
8Table 4. Destination of Sub-Saharan African Countries' exports, 1997 (percent)
African  Asian
United  developing  developing
Country  EEC  States  Japan  countries  countries  Others
West and Central Africa
Benin  16.9  3.2  0.6  12.6  27.3  39.6
Burkina Faso  30.7  0.5  2.1  30.8  23.2  12.7
Cameroon  73.0  0.7  0.7  8.4  12.4  4.7
Central African Rep.  47.5  0.5  0.3  10.0  3.5  38.2
Chad  45.2  2.8  1.6  9.7  24.3  16.3
Congo, Rep. Of  36.2  23.8  0.4  1.4  29.4  8.8
Cote d'Ivoire  52.4  6.7  0.3  25.4  4.7  10.6
Equatorial Guinea  37.1  10.3  15.0  10.7  26.6  0.3
Gabon  12.7  68.0  3.2  1.6  11.0  3.4
Guinea-Bissau  14.4  0.1  0.8  1.6  82.2  0.9
Mali  31.5  1.4  1.0  8.5  44.1  13.4
Niger  46.0  29.8  0.2  8.8  7.8  7.5
Senegal  15.8  0.2  0.3  36.6  27.8  19.3
Togo  14.7  2.4  0.0  22.1  31.2  29.7
Gambia, The  86.1  1.6  4.7  1.0  4.4  2.3
Ghana  49.4  8.4  4.4  17.6  8.5  11.6
Guinea  39.0  12.4  0.4  6.7  4.8  36.6
Liberia  48.0  0.4  0.0  1.3  7.3  43.0
Mauritania  59.9  0.1  24.5  10.9  1.8  2.8
Nigeria  29.0  38.1  1.1  10.5  11.1  10.1
Sierra Leone  69.7  8.0  0.9  4.0  0.7  16.7
East and Southern Africa
Angola  14.6  64.9  0.1  1.5  15.4  3.5
Botswana  ..  ..  ..
Burundi  48.8  0.9  0.0  2.7  0.7  46.9
Congo, Dem. R.  59.5  21.4  3.7  10.2  3.4  1.7
Eritrea  ..  ..  ..
Ethiopia  50.8  12.0  11.2  5.8  2.5  17.7
Kenya  34.5  3.0  0.8  40.5  9.8  11.4
Lesotho  ..  ..  ..
Madagascar  69.1  9.6  5.8  8.0  3.8  3.7
Malawi  27.9  11.8  4.5  25.1  6.3  24.4
Mauritius  74.0  14.3  0.6  5.7  1.8  3.6
Mozanbique  35.5  12.0  8.0  25.1  12.0  7.4
Namibia  ..  ..  ..
Rwanda  66.1  3.6  0.0  4.8  8.0  17.4
Somalia  13.3  0.1  0.0  1.6  2.1  83.0
South Africa  28.8  5.5  4.9  13.8  11.7  35.2
Sudan  35.3  2.3  4.2  2.4  11.6  44.1
Tanzania  33.1  3.6  7.5  16.9  28.4  10.5
Uganda  71.9  6.0  0.7  2.2  3.3  15.9
Zambia  23.1  4.4  10.7  20.8  28.9  12.1
Zimbabwe  31.8  5.2  6.7  37.7  8.9  9.6
Sub-Saharan Africa  33.5  18.1  3.3  13.3  11.6  20.2
Source: IMF, Direction of trade data base and authors' calculations.
93.  Capital flows between the European Union and Sub-Saharan Africa
The  EMU can potentially  affect  Sub-Saharan Africa countries through  many  different
financial linkages: capital markets, foreign direct investment, interest rates, and portfolio
diversification.
3.1. Country risk ratings and access to international capital markets
The  importance  of  the  various  financial  channels  depends  on  the  degree  of  financial
integration  of the two regions. Similar studies for other regions use  credit ratings from
Standard & Poors and Moody's  to assess domestic financial markets. 6 Few Sub-Saharan
African  countries  are  rated  by  either  of  these  companies,  however,  because  of  poor
performance (South Africa is  an  exception). Euromoney  and  The Institutional  Investor
measure a broader range of countries, including those  in Sub-Saharan Africa, and rank
them against each other in terms of risk (table 5). All Sub-Saharan African countries are
ranked very low, except for Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa. The general picture
that emerges is of severely underdeveloped domestic capital markets (see table 5), with
access to capital markets limited, according to Euromoney, to the same three countries that
are ranked  relatively  better  in  terms  of  risk  ratings  (Botswana,  Mauritius,  and  South
Africa).
3.2. Foreign direct investment
The distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Sub-Saharan Africa is very unequal:
South Africa and Nigeria alone accounted for 68 percent of FDI in  1997 (chart 2). It is
argued that one effect of the EMI  would be to redirect European foreign investments back
into  the euro  area  as lower transaction costs  make investments  in  the euro  area more
attractive. But  investors  will already have  anticipated this  decline  in  transaction  costs
earlier on, and FDI has continued to flourish in Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years (chart
2).
FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa is unlikely to be affected much by changes in competitiveness
in  Europe  because  the  degree  of  direct  competition  is  limited  by  the  geographically
6  See Feldman and Temprano-Arroyo  (1998) for countries in  Eastern and Central Europe and the
10disbursed  markets.  European FDI  in  Sub-Saharan Africa is probably motivated  not  by
relative  cost considerations but by the desire to  gain first-mover advantage in  emerging
markets and to diversify risk. Furthermore, a very large share of the FDI in Sub-Saharan
Africa is in either natural resources, which is quite isolated from any effects arising from
the EMU, or concentrated in South Africa where there is a significant domestic market.
Chart  2
Foreign  Direct  Investments  to  SSA,  net  inflows  (mill.  US  $) 1970-1997
~5000  l
l  +4--:Sub-Saharan  Africa  --- South  Africa  Nigeria  *  Angola
Soulrce: World  Bank 1999c.
Mediterranean and Yeyati and Sturtznegger (1  999) for countries in Latin America.
11Table 5. Country risk rankings, March 1999
Access to capital
Risk rankings  markets'
The Institutional
Country  Euromoney  Investor  Euromnoney
West and Central Africa
Benin  144  115  0.13
Burkina Faso  105  106  0.13
Cameroon  135  110  0.13
Central African Republic  158  ..  0.00
Chad  157  ..  0.00
Congo, Rep. of  140  128  0.00
Cote d'Lvoire  121  96  0.17
Equatorial Guinea  155  ..  0.00
Gabon  99  98  0.00
Guinea-Bissau  163  ..  0.00
Mali  108  119  0.00
Niger  129  ..  0.00
Senegal  90  100  0.33
Togo  119  114  0.00
Gambia, The  103  ..  0.00
Ghana  86  78  0.00
Guinea  133  118  0.00
Liberia  173  131  0.00
Mauritania  154  ..  0.00
Nigeria  128  113  1.00
Sierra Leone  170  134  0.00
East and Southern Africa
Angola  149  124  0.00
Botswana  61  40  0.75
Burundi
Congo, Dem. Rep.  168  136  0.00
Eritrea
Ethiopia  148  116  0.00
Kenya  97  97  0.17
Lesotho  116  ..  0.00
Madagascar  162  ...  0.00
Malawi  131  102  0.00
Mauritius  46  39  2.50
Mozambique  150  111  0.00
Namibia  151  66  0.50
Rwanda  165  ..  0.00
Somalia  172  ..  0.00
South Africa  56  50  2.67
Sudan  160  132  0.00
Tanzania  145  109  0.00
Uganda  95  103  0.00
Zambia  147  117  0.00
Zimbabwe  101  91  0.50
Sub-Saharan  Africa  130  103  0.22
(unweighted average)
a The maximum score is 5.00, which is obtained by most OECD countries.
Source: Euromoney and The Institutional Investor
123.3. European interest rate level and volatility
The impact of the euro on Sub-Saharan Africa through its effect on European interest rates
depends on the actual affects on the level and volatility of interest rates in Europe and the
channels  through which  these impacts  affect countries outside of  Europe. This  section
seeks answers to these questions but leaves consequences for foreign debt management for
section 4.2.
The effects of the euro on the level and volatility of the interest rate in Europe are hard to
predict and isolate. The current real interest rate level is at a historical low, which more or
less excludes any significant decrease as a result of the euro launch. Likewise, the initial
months  of  the  euro  launch have,  to  some  extent,  reinforced  the  expectation  that  the
European Central Bank will pursue a relatively strict anti-inflationary policy in order to
gain credibility  (and  in  pursuit  of its  primary  goal, price  stability). In  the longer  run,
however,  the central bank  may find it feasible to loosen monetary  policy. The positive
growth effect expected from the EMU should stimulate investment demand and pull up
interest rates, though whether that comes to pass depends to some extent on whether the
structural reforms widely deemed necessary, especially labor market reform, take place.
The bottom line is that the future level and volatility of European interest rates depend on a
range of factors whose effects work in different directions. No matter what the net effect
turns out to be, however, the impact on Sub-Saharan Africa through capital flows is likely
to be minor. Theory predicts that countries that peg their currency to the euro will be more
exposed to volatility in the European interest rate than countries with flexible exchange
rate regimes, whose real exchange rates can absorb some of the volatility. Again, a key
determining feature  is underdeveloped capital markets, which  to  a large extent  insulate
Sub-Saharan African economies from the events that influence international capital flows.
3.4. Portfolio diversification effects
The basic idea behind portfolio management is to find a balance between risk and return.
The launch of the euro has decreased much of the risk, and hence also the return, in many
13EMU countries, particularly those in southern Europe. For example, the interest rate spread
on long-term government bonds between Germany and Spain, Portugal, and Italy nearly
vanished between 1995 and 1998 as the three countries followed a strict fiscal policy to
comply with the Maastricht Treaty's  fiscal requirements. Now that the euro is a reality,
exchange rate risk has disappeared among EMU participants. What's left are the perceived
differences in country risks related to such factors as differences in liquidity. Even though
the famous "no-bailout" clause (Maastricht Treaty, article 1  04b) makes clear that countries
will  have  to  handle  budgetary  crises  without  help  from  other  EMU  countries,  these
differences in risk are perceived to be very low and are expected to remain so.
With the disappearance of most differences in risk among EMU members, a rebalancing of
the  risk-return mix  now requires  diversification  outside of  the EMU.  In  addition,  the
volume  of  funds  seeking  investment  opportunities  has  increased,  as  the  aging  of
populations in Europe swells the size of pension funds. Likewise, the expected increase in
economic activity in Europe should also lead to increased savings.
Where will the portfolio shift occur? Are Sub-Saharan African countries likely candidates?
Not over the short and medium terms. For the most part, Sub-Saharan African countries
lack  the  basic  features  needed to  attract  foreign  private  investors  (especially  pension
funds),  such  as  a  long  history  of  macroeconomic  stability,  good  credit  ratings  (by
Moody's,  Standard & Poors, and others), and reasonably well developed domestic security
markets  and  stock  exchanges.  In  addition,  some  regulations  affecting  European
institutions, such as the requirement for OECD membership (OECD 1996) for countries to
receive investments, also make it unlikely that there will be any significant portfolio shift
toward Sub-Saharan Africa countries.
In  the long term, however,  the euro has  opened the door  for portfolio investments  for
countries that pursue rigorous fiscal and monetary policies and that develop their capital
markets. To tap into these funds, however, African countries will need to strengthen their
financial integration with global markets.
144.  Financial implications
The introduction of the euro could have financial implications for Sub-Saharan Africa in
the banking system and in foreign debt and reserve management.
4.1. Banking system
The  euro  will  work as  a  catalyst for the  development  of integrated  money  and  bond
markets  in  Europe, increasing competition  among banks  and between  banks  and  other
sources of funds. The greater competition between banks and financial systems in general
should lead to  efficiency gains in terms of resource allocation  and ultimately stimulate
investment and job creation.
Foreign exchange trading,  corporate banking, and governrment-bond trading  account for
over half the profit of a typical large commercial bank. It is expected that European bank
reserves will be reduced by 20 percent over the next decade in these three business areas.
The corporate banking sector is in for difficult times. The introduction of the euro and the
creation of a single market in euro-dominated corporate bonds will make it even harder to
lend money profitably to bigger firms. There will also be difficulties for the deposit and
money market  business. Corporate  customers will no  longer need  accounts  in  various
European currencies, so volumes will shrink. Banks will also lose profits from the money
market as interest rate differentials between euro area currencies are eliminated.
While these are areas in which business is expected to be eliminated or reduced, in other
areas the EMU should create profitable new businesses. The market for euro-denominated
bonds and bank profits from bond and equity trade could increase, for example.
How will these developments in banking systems in Europe affect Sub-Saharan Africa?
The short- and long-term effects are likely to diverge. In the immediate future, the euro
may encourage nationally based banks, in Germany and elsewhere, to attach top priority to
expanding  their  base  across  Europe.  In the  longer term,  however,  as  the  competitive
situation  within  Europe  heats  up  and  margins  are  competed  downward,  a  renewed
15expansion into more profitable non-European markets, including Sub-Saharan Africa, may
again look more appealing.
4.2. Management  offoreign  debt
The euro can affect Sub-Saharan African countries'  management of foreign debt through
changes in European interest rate levels or changes in the real exchange rate of the euro,
especially relative to the dollar.
The effect on debt service depends on the size and composition of the debt. For the region
as a whole, the external debt in 1997 was 202 percent of exports of goods and services and
the debt  service was  13 percent  of exports  (table 6).  These numbers  suggest that  any
change in the European interest rates could have significant effects on the debt-service and
so on development in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in countries where the debt service is
highly exposed to changes in European interest rates.
The volatility  of the  debt burden  depends on  several factors:  Many  countries in  Sub-
Saharan Africa  have  a  very  large  share  of  their  external  debt  issued  at  concessional
terms-38  percent for the region as a whole in 1997.7 For some of the poorest countries,
more than 90 percent of their debt is on concessional terms. When a large share of external
debt is  on concessional  terms at below  market rates of  interest,  the face value  of the
external debt stock is not a good measure of a country's debt burden. A better measure is
the present value of debt.8 The present value of debt is extremely high for almost all Sub-
Saharan countries-above  100 percent of exports for most countries and above 300 percent
for 13 out of 39 Sub-Saharan countries.
The impact of a rise in European interest rate levels on the debt service to  export ratio
depends on the size of the debt, the share of debt denominated in euros (or euro-equivalent
7 Concessional  debt is defned as loans with an original grant element of 25 percent or more. The grant
equivalent  of a loan is its commitment  (present)  value, less the discounted  present value of its contractual
debt service.
8 The net present  value (NPV)  of debt is a measure  that takes  into account  the degree  of concessionality.  It is
defined as the sum of all future debt-service  obligations  (interest  and principal)  on existing  debt, discounted
at the market interest  rate. Whenever  the interest rate on a loan is lower than the market rate, the resulting
NPV of debt is smaller  than its face value,  with  the difference  reflecting  the grant  element.
16currencies; see table 7), the share of foreign debt that is short term or variable-rate long
term, and  the degree of openness in the economy (see  Feldman and  Temprano-Arroyo
1998).9  For the region as a whole, a I percentage point increase in euro interest rates has a
moderately  low, though  not  insignificant, impact of 0.17 percentage  point on  the debt
service to  export ratio (table 8). But there are very large differences among countries in
exposure to European interest rates. The impact is 0.62 percentage point for Cameroon,
0.55percentage point for the Republic of Congo, 0.69 percentage point for Cote d'Ivoire,
1.11 percentage points for the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 2.26 percentage points
for Sudan. The impact is so large for Sudan because it has an extremely large external debt
to exports ratio, relatively large shares of short term and variable-rate long-term debt, and a
large share (30 percent) of its debt denominated in EMU currencies. The high exposure for
the CFA countries-Cameroon,  Republic of Congo, and Cote d'Ivoire-stems  primarily
from their large share of debt denominated in French francs, an EMU currency.
The exchange rate regime (see table 3) and the share of euro-denominated  debt in total
foreign debt (table 7) should be harmonized in order to insulate a country's  debt service
burden from changes in the euro exchange rate. Several CFA members seem to be more
vulnerable to euro exchange rate changes than others because the CFA members peg their
currency to the euro. If the euro depreciates these countries will see a rise in debt service
costs, the size of which will be negatively related to the share of euro-denominated debt;
the opposite will occur if the euro appreciates. Countries with no  "mismatch"  between
share  of  euro-denominated  debt  and  exchange  rate  regime  will  be  less  vulnerable  to
changes in the euro exchange rate.
9 Let DSX  denote the  debt-service-to-export ratio, ieuro  denote the  European interest rate,  and  A denote a
change. Then, algebraically the calculation can be illustrated with the following expression:
ADSX = Aieuro  X ShareE,U x ShareST+V,LT  x (D/GDP)/(X/GDP)
where  the  last  factor boils  down  to the  debt to  exports  ratio.  The calculations depend  on  a number  of
assumptions, but can still give an indication of the magnitude of the effect that changes in interest rates in
Europe will have on debt servicing. On top of the assumptions mentioned in the notes to table 7 and 8 of this
paper,  Feldman  and  Temprano-Arroyo also  assume that  all  fixed-rate long-term  debt  matures within  10
years, with one-tenth of it falling due each year and being refinanced at an interest rate  I percent higher than
the original rate. This allows them to calculate the effects in the longer term, and they show that the effect
increases in the longer term. A similar increase can be  expected for Sub-Saharan Africa, but the effect is
likely to be of a lower magnitude since the average maturity of loans to Sub-Saharan Africa is 20-25 years,
while it is 10-15 years for Central and Eastern European countries. Thus, for Sub-Saharan Africa countries a
much smaller percentage falls due every year. The dynamic effects also depends on how the matured debt is
17Table 6.  Debt, Sub-Saharan Africa, 1996 and 1997
Concessional  Present value
Total external  Debt service  debt  of debt
debt (percentage  (percentage of  (percentage  (percentage of
of exports of  exports of  of total  exports of
goods and  goods and  external  goods and
Countries  services) 1997  services) 1997  debt) 1997  services) 1996
West and CentralAfrica
Benin  268.9  9.1  77.9  135.4
Burkina Faso  295.5  11.8  83.0  152.3
Cameroon  368.7  20.4  42.6  358.1
Central African Republic  410.1  6.1  82.0  264.0
Chad  364.8  12.5  78.3  185.1
Congo, Rep. of  280.9  6.2  36.6  265.8
Cote d'Ivoire  314.6  27.4  28.9  379.4
Equatorial Guinea  65.7  1.4  48.8  117.9
Gabon  129.6  13.1  22.7  109.5
Guinea-Bissau  1,645.2  17.3  72.2  2,204.6
Mali  395.4  10.5  89.0  282.0
Niger  509.4  19.5  66.9  287.8
Senegal  226.6  15.3  65.2  139.9
Togo  198.0  8.1  71.3  134.6
Gambia, The  184.8  11.6  91.5  104.3
Ghana  349.4  29.5  66.5  226.3
Guinea  469.7  21.5  70.6  277.9
Liberia  ..  ..  29.1
Mauritania  553.8  25.6  69.2  287.2
Nigeria  156.6  7.8  4.6  187.6
Sierra Leone  1,235.2  21.1  63.8  590.4
East and Southern Africa
Angola  191.4  15.9  21.9  165.4
Botswana  ..  ..  51.6  16.5
Burundi  1,062.3  29.0  92.8  939.3
Congo, Dem. Rep.  845.7  0.9  25.2  648.9
Eritrea  19.1  0.1  96.1  5.2
Ethiopia  962.9  9.5  85.7  971.6
Kenya  214.9  21.5  57.5  168.3
Lesotho  93.5  6.4  69.1  155.8
Madagascar  522.2  27.0  65.3  391.6
Malawi  351.3  12.4  88.2  226.9
Mauritius  95.4  10.9  13.9  62.5
Mozambique  1,066.0  18.6  56.5  757.3
Namibia  ..
Rwanda  673.3  13.3  88.7  561.8
Somalia  ..  ..  58.7
South Africa  67.8  12.8  0.0  61.4
Sudan  1,459.8  5.1  28.4  1,608.7
Tanzania  576.5  13.0  70.9  390.9
Uganda  429.6  22.1  79.5  264.5
Zambia  501.3  19.9  56.2  447.1
Zimbabwe  159.2  21.7  28.2  136.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 1996  215.4  14.2  36.7  182.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 1997  201.7  12.8  38.0  ..
Source: World Bank 1998a,b and  1999b.
assumed  re-financed  (short  term  or long term  fixed-rate).
18Table 7. Currency composition of long-term debt, 1997
Deutsche  French  Swiss  US
Country  mark  franc  Yen  Multi  Pound  SDR  franc  dollar  EMU  Other
West and
Central. Africa
Benin  0.2  9.2  1.0  15.0  0.3  2.0  0.0  55.3  18.2  17.5
Burkina Faso  0.1  3.5  0.0  19.0  0.0  2.0  0.0  62.4  10.1  13.0
Cameroon  14.5  31.0  0.3  9.2  0.6  0.2  0.8  25.8  55.2  17.7
Centr.Afr.Rep.  0.3  4.8  0.6  18.0  0.0  7.1  2.4  58.8  11.7  8.4
Chad  0.0  5.9  0.0  23.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  56.8  12.9  13.9
Congo, Rep. of  2.7  41.4  0.2  1.7  6.3  0.5  0.3  26.0  54.9  21.0
Cote d'lvoire  3.5  27.1  1.1  16.0  0.8  0.2  0.2  40.9  35.7  9.8
Eq. Guinea  5.0  7.1  0.0  15.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  43.3  26.8  29.3
Gabon  7.3  45.2  0.8  8.7  6.0  0.0  0.7  11.2  63.4  20.3
Guinea-Bissau  0.3  1.0  0.0  24.0  0.0  0.0  12.2  31.9  28.8  30.5
Mali  0.1  18.9  2.7  19.0  1.9  0.0  1.7  25.9  35.8  30.2
Niger  0.0  30.9  1.8  0.0  1.4  3.2  0.0  40.2  42.1  22.4
Senegal  1.6  15.3  2.9  12.0  0.2  0.9  0.3  41.3  29.8  25.1
Togo  1.4  7.4  5.8  7.1  1.7  1.1  10.4  49.7  26.9  15.3
Gambia, The  0.1  1.5  0.0  21.0  5.8  0.1  0.0  50.7  11.8  20.4
Ghana  3.6  1.6  11.8  6.2  4.8  0.8  0.0  61.2  10.3  10.1
Guinea  0.6  8.3  2.6  7.4  0.9  1.2  0.3  51.6  22.8  27.1
Liberia  9.7  1.0  6.6  20.0  1.3  1.5  0.0  53.5  13.9  6.4
Mauritania  0.3  7.2  3.4  1.5  0.6  2.4  0.0  38.1  30.8  46.5
Nigeria  10.9  10.2  11.9  11.0  13.0  0.1  0.5  31.9  27.1  11
Sierra Leone  1.5  2.6  6.8  13.0  0.7  11.0  2.6  42.3  16.6  19.8
East and
Southern Africa
Angola  0.3  3.9  0.8  0.9  1.0  0.9  0.3  86.8  7.1  5.2
Botswana  3.3  0.6  9.6  45.0  4.2  1.9  0.0  12.5  15.6  23.3
Burundi  0.1  5.3  2.5  22.0  0.0  1.8  0.0  56.4  11.2  11.6
Congo, Dem. R.  6.0  14.9  3.2  4.1  1.0  0.4  0.2  44.5  33.9  25.6
Eritrea  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.6  0.0  48.9  24.7  49.4
Ethiopia  1.8  0.1  0.1  8.8  0.2  0.2  0.1  27.5  32.6  61.2
Kenya  2.9  4.5  17.2  10.0  3.4  0.4  2.5  43.0  17.8  15.7
Lesotho  0.0  6.6  0.0  21.0  1.0  6.4  0.0  23.7  27.1  41.0
Madagascar  1.8  13.4  7.5  9.1  0.1  2.7  1.1  49.0  23.9  15.2
Malawi  0.2  0.8  9.3  19.0  8.2  6.3  0.1  54.3  2.2  2.1
Mauritius  1.3  18.0  4.2  11.0  1.4  0.0  0.1  52.5  25.0  11.2
Mozambique  3.9  8.4  1.6  8.2  2.1  1.1  .0.  63.2  18.1  11.6
Namibia...  .....  ....  ...
Rwanda  0.0  7.5  1.0  11.0  0.0  3.8  0.0  50.8  20.8  26.5
Somalia  0.0  4.2  2.6  7.2  0.1  1.3  0.0  51.8  20.6  32.8
South Africa  2.5  0.0  4.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  92.6  2.6  0.1
Sudan  0.8  3.0  2.5  1.6  3.8  0.5  16.9  50.8  30.8  20.1
Tanzania  1.9  1.9  10.1  6.7  10.0  4.9  0.0  45.7  13.2  18.7
Uganda  0.2  0.3  1.5  11.0  1.9  7.6  0.0  66.4  6.0  11.0
Zambia  13.1  2.6  9.4  7.0  6.9  0.3  0.1  46.7  22.8  13.9
Zimbabwe  10.8  4.8  3.4  27.0  5.9  0.4  0.7  26.6  26.7  20.7
Sub-Saharan  4.6  10.6  4.9  8.9  3.8  1.1  1.4  46.9  25.6  17.9
Africa
Note: EMU currencies include the Deutschemark, French franc,  and Swiss franc and 50 percent  of "other"  currencies.
Long-term debt is defined as debt with a maturity above one year.
Source: World Bank 1999c.
19Table  8.  Maturity  composition  of  debt  and  estimated  short-term  effects  of  a  1
percentage point increase in euro-area interest rates.
Increase in 1999
Variable-rate long-  Total external debt  debt service to
Short term debt as  term debt as a  as a percentage of  exports ratio,
a percentage of  percentage of total  exports of goods  (percentage
Country  total foreign debt  foreign debt  and services  points)
West and Central Africa
Benin  8.9  0.9  268.9  0.047
Burkina Faso  5.5  0.0  295.5  0.016
Carneroon  14.3  16.1  368.7  0.618
Central African Republic  7.3  0.6  410.1  0.038
Chad  2.7  0.1  364.8  0.013
Congo, Rep. of  15.0  20.8  280.9  0.551
Cote d'lvoire  17.6  43.5  314.6  0.686
Equatorial Guinea  22.7  1.5  65.7  0.043
Gabon  11.6  13.5  129.6  0.206
Guinea-Bissau  7.8  1.7  1,645.2  0.450
Mali  3.0  0.1  395.4  0.043
Niger  6.0  7.5  509.4  0.290
Senegal  6.3  7.0  226.6  0.090
Togo  3.5  10.4  198.0  0.074
Gambia, The  3.1  0.0  184.8  0.007
Ghana  12.0  5.2  349.4  0.062
Guinea  12.1  0.1  469.7  0.135
Liberia  37.8  7.2
Mauritania  13.0  5.6  553.8  0.316
Nigeria  19.4  17.1  156.6  0.155
Sierra Leone  9.0  1.1  1,235.2  0.208
East and Southern
Africa
Angola  12.6  6.4  191.4  0.026
Botswana  7.1  12.0
Burundi  1.5  0.0  1,062.3  0.018
Congo, Dem. R.  27.7  11.1  845.7  1.112
Eritrea  0.0  0.0  19.1  0.000
Ethiopia  5.7  0.2  962.9  0.186
Kenya  12.9  9.9  214.9  0.087
Lesotho  1.2  9.2  93.5  0.027
Madagascar  4.1  5.9  522.2  0.125
Malawi  1.3  0.3  351.3  0.001
Mauritius  20.1  53.9  95.4  0.176
Mozambique  5.6  8.4  1,066.0  0.270
Namibia  ..
Rwanda  7.2  0.0  673.3  0.100
Somalia  23.1  0.8
South Africa  44.1  24.2  67.8  0.012
Sudan  38.9  11.47  1,459.8  2.257
Tanzania  12.1  4.9  576.5  0.129
Uganda  3.4  2.3  429.6  0.015
Zambia  6.7  7.2  501.3  0.158
Zimbabwe  21.4  21.0  159.2  0.180
Sub-Saharan Africa  19.3  0.14  201.7  0.173
Note: A number of assumptions underlie the calculations: (1) Euro-area interest rates increase by I percent in 1999; (2)
there are no changes in domestic interest rates, exchange rates, debt stocks, or exports as a result of the change in euro-
area interest rates; (3) the currency composition of short-term and variable-rate long-term debt is the same as that of total
long-term debt; (4) the interest rate of the Swiss franc follows that of the euro; (5) 50 percent of the "other" currencies are
from the euro-area.
Source: World Bank 1999c and authors' calculations.
204.3. Reserve management
The European Union expects the euro to become a major reserve currency in competion
with  the U.S.  dollar.  Whether or to what  extent this  will  occur has  been  a subject  of
considerable  controversy  among  observers.  Will  countries  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa
substantially  diversify  their reserve  holdings? If  Europe  succeeds in  making  the  euro
competitive, the euro could cut into part of the seigniorage currently accruing to the United
States  (this  gain  would,  however,  have  to  be  balanced  against  domestic  policy
considerations, such as employment levels). The forces of inertia (and uncertainty about
the new currency) will at first act to maintain the status quo. But if the euro proves to be a
stable  currency,  some  reserve  holders  in  Sub-Saharan Africa  may  increase  their  euro
holdings.
Reserve holdings  of  Sub-Saharan African countries totaled $18.2 billion  in  1998, with
average reserves of 1.8 months of imports. Countries that peg their exchange rate or wish
to limit exchange rate fluctuations hold reserves to provide a cushion against negative net
external  cash  flows  on  current  or  capital  accounts.  Dornbusch  (1999)  explains  why
countries  hold  reserves  and  the  resulting  complications  as  follows.  Reserves  are  a
substitute for adjustment when shocks are temporary and so justify financing rather than
adjustment.  In  the case  of persistent  disturbances, reserves  can help  the  economy  get
through the period before appropriate adjustment takes hold. In a world where there is only
a  single outside  currency,  say  the  dollar,  the  only  relevant  issue  is  to  determine  the
appropriate level of reserves, taking into account the scale of the economy, the volatility of
net cash flows, and the opportunity cost of holding reserves as measured by the differential
between the return on reserves and the cost of capital. The costs of disruptive adjustment or
unwanted exchange rate movements also effect the optimal level of reserves.
But since the world has more than one outside currency, the composition of reserves is also
a  critical  part  of  the  discussion. Not  surprisingly,  the  answer  is  to  hold  a  diversified
portfolio  of  reserves  whose  composition  reflects  the  shares  of  each  currency  in  the
country's  trade  pattern.  The  extensive  indexation  required  for  this  exercize  is  too
cumbersome in practice, however. Small partner countries' currencies or the currencies of
21countries  with  underdeveloped  or  unstable  capital  markets  are  likely  to  have  high
transaction costs associated with holding and managing a reserve position and therefore are
replaced by a proxy currency. As previously argued, the management of external reserves
should  also  take  into  account  the  currency  composition  of  scheduled  debt  service
payments.
Over time, the introduction of the euro will result in the creation of a  deep and  liquid
capital market  in  Europe. The very size of the market  will attract competition,  reduce
spreads,  and  hence  offer  holders  of euro  assets  higher returns  and  better  transactions
potential. The euro will become, as a result, an equal to the U.S. dollar as a reserve asset.
In other words, reserve management will be able to get closer to its target, enjoy higher
returns, and for a more diversified portfolio (in terms of risk exposure) still have a more
liquid position than was possible before. All this because of the emergence of a  single
European capital market. That implies that, over time, as the capital market develops and
becomes more attractive, reserve holdings will shift from dollars toward the euro.
5.  Conclusion
This paper provides an overview of the potential channels through which the euro could
influence African economies.  European growth, trade creation and  trade  diversion, the
euro's  volatility, financial diversification by European investors, banking integration-all
these factors will undoubtedly influence the decisions and  strategies of the many actors
that  will  directly  or  indirectly  affect  Africa. At  this  stage, however,  it  is  difficult  to
conclude that these changes will result in an important macroeconomic impact unless it
becomes the tool of a major policy shift: "euroization" of the continent, which is unlikely
at the current stage.
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